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Abstract: Many economists and psychologists refuse the idea that behavior could be based 
on any other motives than selfish and hedonistic ones, at least in the context of economy, 
mainly based on a methodological premise, not so often on empirical research. The corre-
sponding image of man that is inherent in exchange theories and expectancy-value theories 
has had a strong influence on research over the last decades. Despite this, concepts like Or-
ganizational Citizenship or Corporate Identity are in search of potentials concerning voluntary 
work engagement. And in the ‘civil society’ practical campaigns are looking for voluntary 
workers who help compensate socially disintegrative effects of “capitalism without adjec-
tives” (Vaclav Klaus) and give people back meaning in self-determined work. These are two 
very different things which are deeply linked though. In this article we address this difference, 
criticize the concepts like Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB), discuss concepts of 
prosocial work motivation and organizational democracy, and bind this all together in a con-
ceptual alternative of mutualistic-prosocial work orientation. 
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1  Rational egoists looking for exploitable normative (prosocial) orientations 
 
It is a funny paradox: Theorists of rational choice in different disciplines, who describe man 
as a rational opportunistic calculus on two legs, are searching for normative commitments and 
volunteering of employees which could be instrumentalized by management as an unpaid 
surplus motivation. Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) or “the good soldier syn-
drome” (Organ, 1988) is a representative concept for such a conceptual inconsistency. Being 
motivated to do more than formally agreed on while not complaining about adverse condi-
tions, that is the kind of subjective potential of the subject these scientists want to uncover, 
presenting themselves or their science as “useful” for interested users. Unfortunately, this 
research interest and its object, prosocial orientations or behaviors, are often equated with 
research on motives for voluntary work, solidarity, social responsibility, and civil society. In 
other words: The research motivation and tradition gets equated with (more or less) its con-
trary. Therefore, we reflect on the distinction between an exploitable limited rationality of 
employees and normative orientations beyond individual rational maximization of utility – i.e. 
between an a-social conception of man and a conception of the “complex man” as it is used in 
non-individualist traditions in the social sciences.  
 
Many projects and textbooks of social psychology, organizational psychology, (Anglo-Saxon) 
sociology – and management sciences in general - still show substantial influences of individ-
ual-utilitarian thinking, the rational choice-approach e.g. in the form of value-expectancy 
theories or exchange theories (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro, 2002; Hewstone, Stroebe, & Jonas, 2007; 
House & Mitchell, 2007). Especially, radically questioning the phenomenon of prosocial or-
ganizational behavior and its potentially non-egoistic motives like employees’ prosocial val-
ues or concern for their enterprise (Rioux & Penner, 2001), many management scientists from 
various disciplines refuse the idea that behavior and activity in daily life as well as in organi-
zations could be based on other motives than selfish and hedonistic ones, ‘at last instance’, at 
least. Such psychological conceptualizations are built on the paradigm of the homo 
economicus. 
 
Considering work and organizational psychology, the problem with ‘undersocialized’ and 
context-free models of individual utilitarian behavior (e.g., equity theory of comparing re-
ward/cost balances in relationships by Hatfield et al., 1985; the investment model of social 
relationships by Farrell & Rusbult, 1992) is not primarily that their basic ideas stem from a 
non-psychological discipline, i.e. economics. The point is that the economic reference is 
based on the same methodological individualism (that, correctly or not, still leads back to 
Smith, Ricardo, and Bentham). This paradigm became so hegemonial in North American hu-
man and social sciences that its hypothesis-generating grammar seems to be natural or univer-
sal, i.e. without reasonable alternative. A Nobel prize for the ‘trivial’ psychology of gain 
maximization (Becker, e.g., 1976) not only documented, but also fostered the hegemony of 
this paradigm, reinforced by a row of similar Nobel decorations.  
 
Nonetheless, there’s a large group of other, non-utilitarian traditions which share some com-
mon ground, like philosophical pragmatism, Weberian sociology, symbolic interactionism,   4
structuration theory in sociology, socio-economics or Schumpeterian economics, activity the-
ory and Critical Psychology in psychology, etc. In particular they share two ideas: history 
matters, and “human nature” is social, i.e. also historic and depending on culture. Using this 
paradigm as basis some questions concerning on two influential groups of theories about so-
cial relations and motivation, namely exchange theories (section 2.1) and ostensible concepts 
of prosocial orientations in organizations (section 2.2), must be reformulated, e.g.: 
- Which perspective on action do theories based on the selfishness paradigm assume referring 
to interaction and cooperation compared to non-utilitarian theories? 
- What are the resonances between recent psychological theories and liberalistic economics 
(of the “free market”)? 
- Can the rise of OCB concepts be interpreted as a change in the image of man that underlies 
organizational psychology theories on social motivation?  
- How is work-related prosocial behavior or solidarity conceptualized in approaches like 
OCB? 
- What are the consequences of short-term and one-sided instrumentalization of OCB in com-
plex stakeholder situations and trust-based knowledge economy (and how to study them)? 
 
As a consequence of our criticism of rationalistic-utilitarian theories, in section 3 we will raise 
two further questions for research: 
 
-   What are the sources of social motivation and behavior beyond the individual-utilitarian 
calculus?  
- How to conceptualize prosocial behavior, orientations, and competences beyond the exploi-
tation of instrumentalized OCB? 
 
 
2 From the Instrumentalization of Selfish Individualism to the Instrumenta-
lization of Prosocial Work Orientations? 
2.1 Exchange Theories: Interaction as Interpersonal Trade of Goods? 
Despite its moderate criticism of the individualistic concept of man and some actual progress 
(see Rusbult & Agnew, 2010; Scholl, 2007), classical exchange theory (or interdependence 
theory) of Kelley and Thibaut (1978) represents an anthropology which conceptualizes man 
primarily as egocentric, selfish, and economically oriented. Many versions of the value-
expectancy model of human behavior and of organizational leadership (in the tradition of 
Vroom, 1964) have this underlying image of man. Representatives of exchange theory tried to 
solve the problem of the psychogenesis of social motivation, preferences, and expectancies.  
 
Influenced by economic game theory and behaviorism, Kelley & Thibaut (1978) stress the 
interdependences and temporal perspectives of interacting partners who exchange goods, 
gifts, and acts of behavior (including social support or caress) in dyads or small groups. Their 
theoretical basis suggests: Social motives, value orientations, interactions, and human rela-
tions are determined by economical laws of exchange (“costs”, “profits”, “rewards”, “losses”, 
“comparison level for alternatives”), by balance of power, and by interdependence. Adding   5
and stressing the importance of individual “investments”, (poor) “alternatives”, and “satisfac-
tion”, Rusbult (for a review see Farrell & Rusbult, 1992) radicalized Kelley and Thibaut’s 
exchange theory. According to her, both commitment to industrial relations as well as to close 
relationships is influenced deeply by the “investments” each actor has made. Thus, activities 
of married couples, romantic lovers, or close friends are described in the same utilitarian lan-
guage. Any dimension of activity - time, emotional energy, intimate knowledge, shared prop-
erty etc. – gets reduced to “investment” and further constructs stemming from economics. In a 
similar way, representatives of equity theory, who claim to have a general theory of social 
behavior, conceive socio-economical status, beauty, personality, expression of love, self-
sacrifice, or sexual practices as goods exchanged by interacting partners along a reward/cost 
balance (Hatfield et al. 1985). In several formulas that were established the value of very dif-
ferent personal qualities and human behavior is expressed as a quantity or a currency (for a 
criticism cf. Cropanzano et al., 2005; Sohn-Rethel, 1978). There is no doubt that behavior like 
this occurs. The question is whether this explains “human nature”, interaction, culture, society 
sufficiently, not mentioning all questions concerning development. 
 
Compared to the traditional expectancy-value approach, one theoretical progress within ex-
change theories is that Kelley and Thibaut and other representatives of exchange theories like 
Rusbult and Agnew (2010) have recognized, that interaction partners are able to develop a 
reciprocity of their individual perspectives and of their actions under specific conditions (e.g., 
in experimental prisoner’s dilemma games; in win-win games). This perspective of action 
could be viewed as a simple element and rudimentary ‘predecessor’ of a pattern of prosocial 
work orientation. Due to the experimentally created interdependence of their conditions of 
interaction, the participants in experimental games of scholars of exchange theories often rec-
ognize that each of them can achieve his or her own goals more effectively, or only, by coop-
eration with his or her interaction partner. This implies an individual social perspective that 
may be characterized as an instrumental readiness for social compromise, if this compromise 
is useful for one’s own selfish individual interests. Analogous to entrepreneurial utilitarian-
ism, this represents utilitarianism in a longer perspective. Though, one might point out, that 
the image of man in social exchange theory is that of a permanent competitor, of an inde-
pendent tradesman or salesperson, or a customer in a game that frequently requires some co-
operation if one wants to make a profit for one’s own sake. The experimental control of con-
ditions or the operationalization in questionnaires referring to terms of economics only allows 
a perspective of action which is limited to “rational choice” and equity-oriented social com-
parison within dyads or triads. Compared to daily working life, this is a radical reduction of 
social and societal complexity, of culture and history, as criticized by Cropanzano et al. 
(2005), Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2005), or Miller (1999). 
 
By means of experimental result matrices or equity formulas, different phenomena like help-
fulness, intimate relations, political negotiations, financial affairs, and military conflicts are 
reduced to the same abstractified dimension, which is the exchange value of goods (cf. Israel, 
1971). The analogy to the free market economy, its implicit social rules, and its inherent 
power structures is obvious, and explicated for every day life situations by Becker (1976). Of 
course some behavior can be interpreted this way, but it is not the whole story. Indeed, a spe-  6
cific sort of ‘love’ can be exchanged for money on the free market. Its exchange value can be 
calculated from a business management standpoint, just the same as the value of other ser-
vices like those of scientists, physicians, employers, engineers, or unskilled workers. Accord-
ing to Critical Theory, this reduction is a reification of specific economical relations and cal-
culations that are considered everlasting natural conditions of interpersonal exchange (Israel, 
1971; Sohn-Rethel, 1978). 
 
2.2 Organizational Citizenship Behavior: The Bad Wages of the Good Deed?  
Some post-modern philosophers praise the deregulation and radicalization of market econo-
mies because they discover rising tendencies of “individualization”, “flexibility”, and “free-
dom” etc. However, reflective sociologists, management scientists as well as organizational 
psychologists point - to continue in the language of economy - out the evident costs and 
losses, or in other words, the side-effects of radical de-regulation: the danger it imposes on 
organizational trust and psychological contract (Rousseau, 1998), on social security and co-
herence, and the threatening of physical, mental, and social health of the employees (e.g., 
Moldaschl, 1998; Rifkin, 1995; Rothschild, 2009; Volpert, 2002). Because of a decoupling of 
productive net value added and stock-market transactions, because of high levels of unem-
ployment, or exploitive work contracts (Ackers & Wilkinson, 2003; Korczynski, 2002), or 
because of a polarization between highly mobile and less mobile workers (Shperling & Rous-
seau, 2001), economists, sociologists, and psychologists discuss whether traditional principles 
of equity lose their power as a medium of social integration and employees’ commitment. For 
a lot of employees, the social exchange motivation, including calculative commitment or 
transactional psychological contracts, may not be very profitable any more. 
 
Though, how can we evaluate research on and campaigns for Organizational Citizenship Be-
havior (OCB; Organ, 1988; see reviews: Hoffman, Blair, Meriac, & Woehr, 2007; Podsakoff, 
Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; Wesche & Muck, 2010)? The conception can be consid-
ered as an attempt to counter the described motivational gap and - at the same time - to tap 
new potentials of labor intensification (“human resources”). Probably, the conceptual change 
from the selfishness paradigm to the citizenship construct in parts of organizational psychol-
ogy and organizational behavior research was a response of researchers and management con-
sultants to the danger that (post-)modern firms would fail without a strategy for social integra-
tion. This attempt required some change of the homo oeconomicus model. (Of course, that 
does not mean that psychology as a whole had ever accepted the selfishness paradigm). Thus, 
the question comes up whether this conceptual change represented through OCB mirrors a 
radical change in the image of man or not. 
 
Among others, Brief and Motowidlo (1986) have demonstrated that voluntary behavior occur-
ring in organizations can be distinguished clearly from selfish behavior with reference to the 
behavior motive. 
 
“Prosocial organizational behavior (abbrev.: POB) is behavior, which is ... directed toward an in-
dividual, group, or organization with whom he or she interacts while carrying out his or her organ-  7
izational role, and ... performed with the intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, 
group, or organization toward which it is directed” (p.711).  
 
For example, a study by Rioux and Penner (2001) indicated, that, according to supervisor and 
peer ratings, prosocial motives were substantially associated with OCB-Altruism and, besides, 
with Civic Virtue, while organizational concern motives were associated with Civic Virtue 
and Conscientiousness. Impression management motives (as an indicator of selfishness) 
showed only a minor influence on Sportsmanship. Other researchers in pedagogics, cultural 
anthropology, social, cultural or developmental psychology  support the evidence, that proso-
cial behavior beyond the verdict of selfishness does exist as an anthropological possibility of 
humanity, and as an implicit potential of social embeddedness (overviews: Harris & Johnson, 
2006; Miller, 1999; Shamir, 1990; de Waal, 2008). Concepts related to POB, like OCB, have 
provided organizational psychology with a construct of prosocial behavior, which allows to 
differentiate prosocial and selfish (incl. individual-utilitarian) work orientations within or-
ganizations. According to Konovsky and Organ’s empirically approved operationalization 
(1996, p.255) which influenced many further studies OCB encompasses five factors: 
 
- “Altruism, or acts of helping specific individuals in face-to-face interaction at work”  
- “Courtesy, which describes the gestures that people exhibit at work to help prevent work 
problems for others” 
- “Sportsmanship, [...] the inclination to absorb minor inconveniences and impositions [...] 
without complaints” 
- “Generalized Compliance” that means “adherence to rules regarding attendance, punctuality, 
use of time [...], and respect for organizational property” 
- “Civic Virtue, e.g. attendance at meetings, keeping oneself informed about developments 
[...] and otherwise practicing constructive and appropriate forms of involvement in the 
governance of the workplace” 
 
Moorman & Blakely (1995) presented a similar influential operationalization comprising the 
four factors “Interpersonal Helping”, “Individual Initiative”, “Personal Industry”, and “Loyal 
Boosterism” while Van Dyne, Graham, & Dienisch (1994) found empirical support for the 
three factors “Loyality”, “Obedience”, and “Participation”. Furthermore, Podsakoff, Ahearne, 
& MacKenzie (1997) suggested a three-dimensional model, namely “Helping”, “Civic Vir-
tue”, and “Sportsmanship”. 
 
That sounds like a summing up for the defense of prosocial behavior and democracy at work. 
The theoretical progress of OCB is considered as a turning away from mere “economic ex-
change” or “reciprocity in trade” orientations (see Graham & Organ, 1993; Organ, 1990). A 
closer look at theory and operationalization of OCB and closely related constructs (Coleman 
& Borman, 2000; Konovsky & Organ, 1996; Lee & Allen, 2002; McNeely & Meglino, 1994; 
Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Podsakoff et al., 1997; Van Dyne et al., 1994) reveals, however, 
that OCB is not so much aimed at the support of prosocial or moral competencies, personality 
development, individual well-being, or democratic decision making for its own sake, but at 
the effectiveness of “the” enterprise (see an exemplary meta-analysis by Podsakoff et al., 
2009). Most item-contents of scales like “Generalized Compliance”, “Conscientiousness”,   8
“Obedience”, “Loyalty”, “Sportsmanship”, or even “Civic Virtue” from several OCB meas-
ures are clearly oriented toward the financial interests of owners and their management 
agents. The subordinates primarily play the role of “good soldiers” (Organ, 1988) who prac-
tice virtues like company patriotism, sparingness, housekeeping, punctuality, flexible con-
formability, not complaining about minor nuisances, attendance, and creation of improvement 
suggestions. Here, “Civic Virtue” is not referring to employees’ democratic participation in 
organizational decisions or to their civil courage and solidarity but “… implies an obligation 
to participate in appropriate ways to governance, even though this participation may assume 
no grander forms than reading and responding to one’s mail, attending meetings, and in gen-
eral keeping up with developments and issues” (Organ, 1990, p.48). 
 
Altogether, operationalization of OCB does not refer to civic culture and democratic citizen-
ship but to obedience of subordinates – which is consistent with the repeated notion of the 
“good soldier”… This normative economic tendency already appears in Organs’ well-
accepted definition of OCB as “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or ex-
plicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effec-
tive functioning of the organization” (Organ, 1988, p.4). In several contributions proponents 
praise OCB as a mean to open up new resources that do not have to be remunerated (per defi-
nition!). Though, in representative texts and literature reviews, normally nobody raises ques-
tions whom OCB serves, if concrete practices of OCB are socially acceptable, or, might even 
have negative effects for the people or the public. We all know examples where employees 
were loyal to their company, defending its environmental harms or damages for suppliers 
(sweatshop labor), thus being loyal to the firm but not to colleagues, suppliers, the public. 
According to the classical definition, such behavior represents (organizational) “citizenship” 
behavior whereas it is not compatible with positive civic or citizenship behavior according to 
its prevailing notion in political science (see below). Just like a soldier who fights for a dicta-
tor and does not ask whether the order is legitimate or not: just obey; and do what you have 
been told . This is an unconditional application of a value without any moral conflict and re-
flection. 
 
In the view of management scientists like Organ helping acts only are considered if they con-
tribute to the effectiveness of “the” organization. In this way of thinking, OCB is an instru-
mental strategy to exploit orientations that people bring from outside the firm (family, com-
munity etc.) into the firm, including the risk to consume them, to use them up (Moldaschl & 
Weber, 1998; Moldaschl, 2005). Coleman and Borman (2000) even go further on this. Their 
conceptual clone “Citizenship Performance Behavior” including “Job/Task Citizenship Per-
formance”
1 affirms this economic instrumentalism explicitly: Citizenship here is limited to 
values and behaviors which are functional for “the” enterprise. The same is true for represen-
tative research reviews considering outcomes of OCB that focus upon economic criteria like 
productivity, efficiency, profitability, cost reduction, turnover, absenteeism, and customer 
satisfaction (Podsakoff et al., 2009). In 1990, already, falling back into the economic ex-
change paradigm, Organ recommended to managers: “Do not depend on OCB; define it away 
                                                  
1
 like “persisting with enthusiasm on own job”, “working hard with extra effort”, “engaging in self-development 
to improve one’s own effectiveness”, or displaying dedication on the job”   9
with a thorough going basis of contractual exchange, in which every desired form of contribu-
tion is specified, weighted, rigorously measured, and systematically rewarded by formal sys-
tems” (Organ, 1990, p. 69).  
 
That’s management science, not science oriented towards or useful for other stakeholders. Of 
course, it might also be useful for owners, big shareholders. But its simple causal logics are 
far beyond the complexity of multi-actor exchange processes, mutual solidarities and power 
struggles, contradictory normative obligations, and cultural contexts. And thus, suggesting 
simple exploitability of non-reflecting work subjects, this kind of science might also be harm-
ful for management, owners, stakeholders in the long run. Concepts of simple causality tend 
to fail when they inform actors in complex environments.  
 
Wesche and Muck (2010) present a thorough review on OCB and other forms of voluntary 
work engagement and criticize their one-sided and short-term instrumentalist perspective. 
They propose to include constructive-critical behavior (e.g., whistle-blowing in case of cor-
ruption) and “voice” behavior (e.g., protest and counter proposals) in OCB-definitions ensur-
ing that those definitions tend more in the direction of established constructs of citizenship in 
terms of political science. Nevertheless, they restrict citizenship behavior again to long-term, 
“legitimate interests of the organization” and reproduce reification and instrumentalization on 
a higher (maybe more social responsible) level. As if the interest of the firm is always clear, 
transparent, and indisputable. What we find here is an oversimplifying conception of organi-
zation and its dynamics. 
 
Brief and Motowidlo’s (1986) construct of Prosocial Organizational Behavior opened up a 
theoretical alternative to the narrow definition of the existing semantic framework of OCB: 
“There are other expressions of prosocial behavior, though, that can detract from organiza-
tional effectiveness” (p.711). For example, a strike of colleagues against exploitative work 
intensification threatening health and well-being or against their supervisor who has mobbed 
one of them, or an employees’ collective fight to take over a badly-managed enterprise to save 
their own workplaces is compatible with Brief and Motowidlo’s definition of prosocial behav-
ior but incompatible with the OCB concept. 
 
In the end, we must question seriously whether the behavior addressed by OCB can be called 
“prosocial” or “citizenship” behavior. OCB more or less resembles stupid, non-reflective be-
havior which we even wouldn’t like to expect from soldiers. Representatives of OCB expect 
exploitable extra-role orientations like “altruism”, courtesy, cooperation, et cetera. In doing 
so, they neglect that membership in instrumental organizations which are not constituted de-
mocratically is different than being a member of society. Being loyal to representatives of 
capital (who quite often have different goals than owners themselves, for e.g. the principal-
agent-approach states) is not the same as mutual help, solidarity, and democratic participation 
(see also Ferraro et al., 2005; Israel, 1971).  
 
What are the unintended consequences of such a one-sided instrumentalization of prosocial 
behaviors? If a minority among the stakeholders is able to draw (extra-)profits by the utiliza-  10
tion of prosocial orientation, this very probably will lead to the destruction of these resources; 
people cannot be fooled over a long period of time. Based on a socio-economic theory of im-
material resources, we could show empirically far-reaching, unintended effects of utilitarian 
instrumentalizations of prosocial orientation and competencies, e.g. concerning dimensions 
such as social support and cohesion in industrial work groups (Moldaschl 2005). Neglecting 
imbalances between assigned tasks and given resources (e.g. time, personnel, information, 
skilling, qualification, competence), managers’ strategies to instrumentalize prosocial orienta-
tion resulted in the erosion of citizenship behavior. Employees for instance became aware that 
the more they compensated (e.g., sick leave or personnel displacement) by mutual support, 
the more the shown reserves were demanded by management in the next round of rationaliza-
tion. One reaction was that social support and group cohesion turned into solidarity against 
managerial objectives and strategies. Resources remained the same but, in this case, they were 
utilized by other actors for their own interests - still resources for employees, but restrictions 
and barriers now for management; it is a matter of perspective and affiliation.  
 
Another reaction (or better: counter strategy) of employees was to reduce their helping behav-
ior, i.e. social support more and more. Or their group cohesion eroded because of conflicts 
about workload, responsibilities, protective tactics, and intra-individual contradictions be-
tween autonomy interests and collaboration norms. In some of the cases studied the inter-
group cooperation also decreased. For example: Living resources grow by utilization – but not 
by simple instrumentalization for the interests of one group of actors; at least not in the long 
run. 
 
One lesson that can be learned from observations like this is that an unreflected transfer of 
societal conceptions of citizenship to the organizational level leads to false conclusions. And 
vice versa: Failures like the above teach us that the emergence or production, the reproduc-
tion, and augmentation of prosocial orientations (social capital) depends on recognition and is 
embedded in contexts of substantial participation. Definitions of “real” citizenship behavior 
can be found for instance in theories of democracy and social philosophy (e.g. Barber, 1984; 
Galbraith, 1997, Pateman, 1970; Ulrich, 2004). Arguing with Kant, those activities and values 
(or orientations) can be seen as prosocial which can be generalized; i.e. they in the worst case 
do not cause any harm or disadvantage to any other actor, and contribute to the wealth of all 
in the best case. A lot of mature citizens’ orientation toward civic behavior can be regarded as 
interpretation of the enlightenment-principles: freedom, equality, and brotherhood/sisterhood 
as the basis of modern western societies. That includes e.g. protecting human dignity, toler-
ance towards differing opinions and ways of life, active political participation, shared respon-
sibility for collective governance of the community, readiness to reflect and to legitimate 
one’s own acting, accordance with fair treatments in regulating conflicts, moral courage, 
fighting against poverty, and engagement against social discrimination (see several studies 
reported by Klicperová-Baker, 1998). Ideally, these civic orientations or virtues are coupled 
with forms of solidarity, e.g. with unprivileged people geographically far abroad.  
 
   11
3  Mutualistic-prosocial Work Orientation in Organizations and Organizational 
Democracy 
As a consequence of our criticism of rationalistic-utilitarian theories (here in the field of or-
ganizational and social psychology) we raise two further questions for research in organiza-
tional behavior: 
 
-   What are the sources of behavior beyond the individual-utilitarian calculus? 
-  How to conceptualize prosocial behavior, orientations, and competences beyond an ideal 
type of naïve altruism that disregards the social context and provokes the exploitation of 
“good Samaritans”. 
 
A precondition of such a conceptualization of prosocial organizational behavior requires giv-
ing up the theoretical dichotomy between selfish and altruistic behavior. We should build on a 
theoretically sound and empirically testable culture-historical anthropology. Many authors do 
agree that “prosocial behavior is behavior which the actor expects will benefit the person or 
persons to whom it is directed”, without himself having individual advantages of it, as Brief 
and Motowidlo (1986, p.711) summarize well-known definitions. To a certain degree, this 
dichotomy is an artifact, which gains more (internal) validity within very restricted settings of 
social-psychological laboratory experiments concerning short-term attitudinal or behavioral 
effects than within complex organizational contexts in working-life and in everyday-life. 
Therefore, authors like Rioux and Penner (2001), Shamir (1990), or Tjosvold (1998), who are 
influenced by cross-cultural research, argue that it would make more sense to conceptualize 
prosocial and selfish orientations as of two independent types of human motives, which can 
be shared by the same person, depending on respective contexts and biographical history (cf. 
the study by Rioux & Penner, 2001). Nevertheless, the question to what extent biographical 
incidents, conditions of socialization, and current organizational contexts contribute to the 
stabilization of a respective actors’ specific orientation is of high theoretical and practical im-
portance. Knowing more about such influencing factors would help orientate principles of 
leadership, communication, and decision making toward a promotion of prosocial behaviors 
in the organization. 
 
Further, there is a need for a clear conceptual differentiation between prosocial and selfish 
components of behavioral orientation. If not, if each behavior is labeled as “selfish”, such a 
pure semantical explanation of behavior may result in a prescriptive doctrinaire tautology. On 
the one hand, researchers, among them many economists, who consider human selfishness an 
universal and exclusive motive give up the possibility to differentiate distinct qualities of so-
cial motivation. Thereby, they narrow possibilities of scientific cognition artificially. On the 
other hand, ways of thinking within organizational psychology research are influenced by 
very specific concepts of business economics, namely ‘neo-liberal variants’. Ferraro et al. 
(2005) have demonstrated how universal selfishness as an axiom of economics becomes a 
social norm influencing mindsets of organizational scientists as well as of everyday actors 
provoking self-fulfilling prophecy effects in a societal climate of market radicalism whereas 
its societal construction by means of business education and mass media is ignored. For that   12
reason, there is a risk that selection of research questions, criteria of research funding, and the 
way, how psychological models are constructed is influenced by postulates and goals that do 
not primarily stem from psychology (cf. Etzioni, 1988; Miller, 1999). 
 
Coming from theory to empirics: Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of proso-
cial orientations (as a readiness for prosocial behavior), embedded in specific socio-economic 
systems, beyond pure selfishness or pure, ‘selfishless’ altruism or naïve, exploitable OCB? 
Moreover, under what conditions and in which contexts does such an alternative form of pro-
social orientation occur - if it occurs at all?  
 
Of course, answers to these fundamental questions cannot be context-free. But the hypothesis 
is plausible that components of a further form  of prosocial work orientation may occur more 
frequently within organizational settings that are characterized by self-governed, collaborative 
work  or by communitarian principles. In fact, the existence of several (attitudinal, value-
based, or behavioral) phenomena connected with a pattern of prosocial work orientation was 
demonstrated empirically  
 
- in Kibbutzim or communitarian communities (e.g. studies by Colby, Kohlberg, Snarey, & 
Reimer, 1988; Rosner, 1998; Shamir, 1990; Wiesmüller, 2004), and in former Eastern 
Europe socialistic work collectives (e.g. Neubert & Tomczyk, 1986; Petrovsky, 1985; see a 
research review by Weber, 1997); 
- in high-participative, democratically structured or in employee-owned collectivist firms in 
Western Europe (see studies by Goletz, 2001; Weber, Unterrainer, & Schmid, 2009 and a 
research review by Vilmar & Weber, 2004) and in the United States (e.g. Rothschild, 2009) 
- in enterprises practicing corporate volunteering or corporate citizenship (see a study by 
Mieg, Gentile, & Wehner, 2008) 
- and in self-regulated work groups practicing direct democratic decion making in industy 
(promoting common task orientation and mutual support as it was conceptualized with re-
gard to Skandinavian, German, and Swiss Humanization of Work projects within the socio-
technical systems approach, e.g. Emery & Thorsrud, 1976; see reviews by Moldaschl & 
Weber, 1998; Ulich & Weber, 1996).  
 
With reference to the mentioned research, we suggest calling the pattern of work orientation 
and related phenomena that is presented summarily in Table 1 mutualistic-prosocial. The 
term “mutualistic” refers to Robert Owen (Owen, 1963) and other theorists of a co-operative 
economy. In its ideal-typical form, the mutualistic-prosocial work orientation represents the 
readiness of organization members to execute supportive actions directed toward others 
within one’s organization, society, or in other societies, with the intention of promoting the 
welfare of those others (cf. Weber et al., 2009). Opposite to the employer-oriented focus in 
OCB research, mutualistic-prosocial work orientation incorporates solidarity at work, namely 
willingness to show consideration for work-related political interests of one’s peers. Workers 
who demonstrate solidarity consider their own behaviors as part of community collective ac-
tion, eschew short-time selfish interests or opportunism, and do not accept a social-darwinist   13
perspective of the world of labor. Solidarity includes workers’ readiness to join together in 
opposing unfair treatment by management.  
 
Table 1 summarizes components of mutualistic-prosocial work orientation as they appeared in 
the above mentioned empirical studies and research reviews. They are classified concerning 
two dimensions, namely the (spatial) level of generalized validity (universality in the sense of 
ethics) and the (temporal) level of prosocial foresight and care for subsistence. The schedule 
is non-exclusive and the allocation is only accentuating (i.e., some components fit into other 
cells, too). 
 
One of the research traditions interested in dynamic relations between the socialization of 
prosocial orientations and the development of democracy is the research in organizational 
democracy. In her seminal work on participatory democracy, Pateman (1970) pointed out a 
field of socialisation, which supports peoples’ readiness to engage voluntarily for societal 
concerns, that was yet rarely taken into consideration in research on volunteering. Enterprises 
that offer employees opportunities to participate in substantial decisions on organizational 
issues potentially support their involvement far beyond selfish interests, resulting in a sense of 
political efficacy and solidarity behaviors at work. Pateman expected democratic employee 
participation to enhance civic virtues outside of the organization as well, assuming that organ-
izational participation gives rise to employees’ prosocial orientations toward societal or cos-
mopolitical purposes. Also in contrast to OCB and in accordance with the spillover hypothe-
sis, we conceptualize a close link between mutualistic-prosocial work orientation and commu-
nity-related behavioral orientations, i.e. societal citizenship behaviors, which are also impor-
tant for the functioning of the civil society. These orientations encompass citizens willingness 
to act on humanitarian-egalitarian ethical principles (Doll & Dick, 2000) like protecting hu-
man life and dignity, serving the public good, supporting the social welfare system, fighting 
against poverty, on the one hand, and their readiness to engage in democratic political activity 
(see Klicperová-Baker, 1998) like defending democratic institutions and freedom of opinion, 
engaging in protests against corruption, political repression, or antidemocratic movements, 
showing openness to differing opinions and ways of life, or advocating minorities’ rights, on 
the other. All in all, this spillover hypothesis has gained much conceptual but only little em-
pirical attention, especially, if democratically structured enterprises are considered (for a sup-
porting study see Weber et al., 2009). Existing research indicates moderate empirical support 
as brief literature reviews by Greenberg (2008), Moldaschl and Weber (2009), or Rothschild 
(2009) have demonstrated.    14
Table 1. Indicators of mutualistic-prosocial work orientation 
Level of generalized 
validity 
Foresight and care for subsistence 




social perspective-taking, empathy, 
sparing each other mistakes or frustra-
tions (forthought)  
giving assistance, help, support (also 
beyond pure reciprocity) 
high-level individual moral reasoning 
concerning direct interaction partners 
 
Group or organization 
 
using production resources (tools etc.) 
together 
waiving of individual short-term re-
turns in favor of long-term benefits 
for the collective 
collectivistic work motivation as 
shared motive to work together in 
collective effort (also beyond effort-
related equity) 
applying equality principle or need 
principle when distributing revenues 
(e.g., with respect to handicapped 
coworkers) 
acts of solidarity (e.g., against a su-
pervisor’s unjust behavior) 
high moral standards of justice and 
fairness applied to processes of opera-
tional decision making 
sharing and collective promoting 
of common knowledge and skills 
(also beyond expectation of service 
in return) 
continuous (further-) development 
of common tools, knowledge 
stores, methods which are useful in 
future work situations 
acts of solidarity (e.g., participa-
tion in a countrywide strike for 
better occupational health) 
high moral standards of justice and 
fairness applied to processes of 
strategic decision making 
Society or humankind 
 
applying humanitarian-egalitarian 
ethical principles (e.g., putting pres-
sure on a supplier who exploits his 
workers ruthlessly) 
applying high moral standards of 
justice and care to societal or cosmo-
politan problems (e.g., recruiting 
refugees) 
contributing to interorganizational 
resources and collective goods 
(also beyond expectation of service 
in return) 
applying humanitarian-egalitarian 
ethical principles (e.g., engage-
ment in an organization that is 
serving the public good) 
engaging in democratic political 
activity (e.g., supporting an em-
ployers’ initiative for economic 
democracy)  
applying high moral standards of 
justice and care to societal or cos-
mopolitan problems (e.g., develop-
ing and applying rules for fair 
global trade) 
 
Thus, fostering the development of elements of the mutualistic-prosocial work orientation 
through employees’ participation in democratic decicion-making, participative leadership, and 
sociomoral climate can be considered complimentary to corporate volunteering (see Christen   15
Jacob, Seyr, & Wehner, 2009). The latter strategy is serving the public good directly through 
organizing and supporting the social engagement of a firm’s employees which, in turn, may 
cause a (further) development of their prosocial orientations. Conversely, in creating a field of 
intraorganizational democractic socialisation the former strategy aims at an indirect support 
of employees’ voluntary service for the society. 
 
In contrast to Organ’s (1988) definition of OCB, the concept of prosocial work behaviors pre-
sented here includes collective acts (of ‘micropolitical’ or institutional industrial-relations 
type) of employees to assert their genuine interests, for instance against intensification, down-
sizing, or ideological domination by corporate identity concepts. Interestingly, in a typology 
Graham and Organ (1993) distinguished the Covenantal Organization from the Transactional 
(i.e., utilitarian) and the Social Exchange Organization. To some extent, covenantal enter-
prises seem to support similar behavioral orientations as those listed above. Covenantal or-
ganizations “… are generally characterized by a high level of involvement of people at all 
levels in various forms of government” (Graham and Organ, 1993, p.495). They describe this 
“… as a form of OCB that is akin to responsible political participation”. What, at first, sounds 
like an approval of organizational democracy, though ends in appeasement: “This participa-
tion, however, does not assume or require pure democracy, since DePree notes, ‘having a say 
differs from having a vote‘” (p.495). 
 
In contrast to research in kibbutz industry and communitarian firms not much empirical re-
search has been done with regard to an appearance of prosocial behavior in democratic enter-
prises. This is astonishing because democratically organized enterprises could be seen as so-
cial laboratories for the benefit of research and practice in work and organizational psychol-
ogy. For example, in 2011, the European Confederation of Workers' Co-operatives, Social 
Co-operatives and Social and Participative Enterprises (CECOP) represents about 50.000 en-
terprises with 1.4 million employees. Further firms similar to collectivist enterprises will 
probably develop in the service sector, for example, start-up firms in IT and software branch, 
as Shperling and Rousseau (2001) suggested in a review. 
 
A basic but under-researched question is whether the developmental chances for components 
mutualistic-prosocial work orientation are different in different socio-economical settings. 
Results of a small, explorative focused-interview study on orientations of 21 representatives 
of 13 Swiss firms that were interested in participating in an interorganizational network of 
idea exchange support a differentiation between four different work-related social orientations 
(Weber, Ostendorp, & Wehner, , 2003). One of them, Type III lends support that actors tend 
to demonstrate mutualistic-prosocial orientation in enterprises that practice a high level of 
organizational democracy. 
 
Since most of the research on communitarian or democratic enterprises is based on qualitative 
research methods and case studies with relatively small-sized samples, and because frequency 
rate and context factors of the specific form of mutualistic-prosocial work orientation still 
remain unexplained existing research should be complemented by broader studies, including 
quantitative methods and more sophisticated research designs. However, available cross-  16
cultural studies on organizational participation with large sample-sizes often suffer from un-
der-represented sub-samples of enterprises with democratic constitution (for a review see 
Strauss, 1998), although the latter do exist in reality. Thus, there is a risk within the main-
stream of organizational psychology research that findings stemming from quantitative stud-
ies on participation which are characterized by under-represented or excluded sub-samples of 
high-democratic firms are considered as the only possible, universal findings. Therefore, the 
normative power of facts leads to a confusion between prevalent  states of (individual-
utilitarian) social motives at the present time, represented by the statistical average, and de-
velopments of (pro-)social motives whose growth would be possible in the future. One open 
question, for example, is whether an identical amount of OCB or mutualistic-prosocial orien-
tation would be found within settings characterized by substantial organizational democracy, 
compared to non-democratic enterprises (cf. studies by Goletz, 2001 and Weber et al., 2009). 
 
Our conceptual proposal does not imply that a mutualistic-prosocial work orientation would 
exclude conflicts among members of democratic enterprises, co-operatives, and communities 
– on the contrary. Just because we do not base our perspective in harmonistic and moralistic a 
priories, the question, how prosocial orientations and practices can develop and be developed 
becomes so important. Kibbutz research as well as research on democratic enterprises demon-
strates, that prosocial work orientations and conflicts of interests both occur (e.g., Moldaschl 
& Weber, 2009; Rosner, 1998; Viggiani, 1997). Moreover, we do not assume a deterministic 
connection between organizational democracy and prosocial orientations. Further factors, like 
earlier education in family and school, organizational conflict regulation styles, resources un-
der the control of the employees, or the economic situation of their enterprise have a consid-
erable influence upon workers’ social orientations (Greenberg, 2008). For example, under the 
pressure of “neo-liberal” deregulation of the markets a part of the Israeli kibbutzim have left 
some of their main principles while others retain democratic governance and collective own-
ership (Palgi, 2004). 
 
4  Some Concluding Remarks  
Since chapter 3 already presents some of our conclusions about the present mainstream in 
(psychological) management science, we want finish here by sharpening the arguments.  
 
(1) The construction of the homo economicus as a research paradigm is a recursive process. 
Science informs practitioners designing organizational reality (and everything else) as if it 
would be true – and vice versa, in confirming transaction. Even if the results often are so 
poor, the circle tends to push reality more in that direction. This represents a process of self-
fulfilling prophecy (see e.g. Miller 1999, Ferraro et al. 2005) If management (and its zealous 
science) follows the instrumentalism-paradigm, employees (and all other stakeholders) will 
likely reduce their extra-instrumental inputs – and of course: vice versa. Whether the contrary 
may happen in firms like several enterprises in Germany (see Pullig, 2000) as well as in Swit-
zerland (see Netzwerk sozial verantwortliche Wirtschaft, 2004) should be researched empiri-  17
cally. Together with researchers managers of those firms are developing criteria for social and 
ecological values concerning responsibility for the employees and for national economy. 
 
(2) Criticizing utilitarian and causalistic theories of social motivation in organizational con-
texts is an important political and educational task. It is necessary to preserve, produce, and 
communicate knowledge about the other side, about principles of human dignity, quality of 
working-life, and organizational democracy. As John Kenneth Galbraith stated (1997), a mar-
ket economy can only work if there are non-market preconditions, resources, and regulations. 
The awareness of these preconditions and of their genesis should be developed in academic 
education. If not, there is a risk that students may adapt reifications and knowledge of instru-
mentalization without any critical and ethical reflection and that students develop indifference 
towards the effects of their later activities in enterprises, that is, indifference towards the vic-





Ackers, P. & Wilkinson, A. (Eds.) (2003). Understanding Work and Employment. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Barber, B. R. (1984). Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California Press. 
Becker, G. S. (1976). An Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago: Aldine. 
Brief, A.P. & Motowidlo, S.J. (1986). Prosocial organizational behaviors. Academy of Management 
Review, 11, 710-725. 
Christen Jacob, M., Seyr, S. & Wehner, T. (2009). Corporate Volunteering: Eine Chance für HR Ver-
antwortliche? In G. Ochsenbein et al. (Hrsg.), Human Resources Management Jahrbuch (S.299-
318). Zürich: Weka.  
Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Snarey, J., & Reimer, J. (1988). The development of moral reasoning among 
Kibbutz Adolescents: A longtudinal study. In A. Colby & L. Kohlberg (Eds.), The Measurement of 
Moral Judgment (Vol.1) (pp.129-149). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge/Mass.: The Belkap Press. 
Coleman, V. I. & Borman, W. C. (2000). Investigating the underlying structure of the citizenship per-
formance domain. Human Resource Management Review, 10, 25–44. 
Coyle-Shapiro, J. A.-M. (2002). A Psychological Contract Perspective on Organizational Citizenship 
Behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23 (8), 927-946. 
Cropanzano, R., Goldman, B. & Folger, R. (2005). Self-Interest: Defining and Understanding a Hu-
man Motive. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26 (8), 985-992. 
de Waal, F.B.M. (2008). Putting the altruism back to altruism: The evolution of empathy. Annual Re-
view of Psychology, 59, 279-300. 
Emery, F.E. & Thorsrud, E. (1976). Democracy at work. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.   18
Doll, J., & Dick, M. (2000). Protestantische Ethik und humanitaer-egalitaere Ethik. Studien zur Ent-
wicklung zweier deutschsprachiger Ethikskalen. Zeitschrift fuer Differentielle und Diagnostische 
Psychologie 21, 138-151.  
Etzioni, A. (1988). The Moral Dimension. Toward a new Economics. New York: The Free Press. 
Farrell, D. & Rusbult, C. E. (1992). Exploring the exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect typology: The influ-
ence of job satisfaction, quality of alternatives, and investment size. Employee Responsibilities and 
Rights Journal, 5 (3), 201-218. 
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R.I. (2005). Economics language and assumptions: how theories can 
become self-fulfilling. Academy of Management Review, 30 (1), 8-24. 
Galbraith, J. K. (1997). The Good Society. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin. 
Goletz, H.P. (2001). Partizipation in Kleinbetrieben: Korrelate, Moderatoren und Mediatoren. (Unve-
röff. Diplomarbeit). Marburg: Universität, Fachbereich Psychologie. 
Graham, J.W. & Organ, D.W. (1993). Commitment and the convenantal organization. Journal of 
Managerial Issues, 5, 483-502.  
Greenberg, E. S. (2008). Spillovers from cooperative and democratic workplaces: Have the benefits 
been oversold? In B. A. Sullivan, M. Snyder, & J. L. Sullivan (Eds.), Cooperation: The political psy-
chology of effective human interaction (pp. 219-239). Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing. 
Harris, M. & Johnson, O. (2006). Cultural Anthropology. New York: Harper & Row. 
Hatfield, E., Traupmann, J., Sprecher, S., Utne, M., & Hay, J. (1985). Equity and intimate relation-
ships: Recent research. In W. Ickes (Ed.), Compatible and Incompatible Relationships (pp.91-117). 
New York: Springer. 
Hewstone, M., Stroebe, W., & Jonas, K (Eds.) (2007). Introduction to Social Psychology (4
th Ed.). 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hoffman, B. J., Blair, C. A., Meriac, J. P., & Woehr, D. J. (2007). Expanding the criterion domain? A 
quantitative review of the OCB literature. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 555–566. 
House, R. J., & Mitchell, T. R. (2007). Path-goal theory of leadership. In R. P. Vecchio, R. P. Vecchio 
(Eds.), Leadership: Understanding the dynamics of power and influence in organizations (2nd ed.) 
(pp. 241-254). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.  
Israel, J. (1971). Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon. 
Kelley, H. H. & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal Relations: A theory of Interdependence. New 
York: Wiley. 
Klicperová-Baker, M. (Ed.) (1998). Ready For Democracy? Prague: Academy of Sciences of the 
Czech Republic. 
Korczynski, M. (2002). Human Resource Management in Service Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Konovsky, M. A. & Organ, D. W. (1996). Disposional and contextual determinants of organizational 
citizenship behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 17, 253-266. 
Lee, K. & Allen, N.J. (2002). Organizational citizenship behavior workplace deviance and: the role of 
affect and cognitions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 131-142. 
McNeely, B. L. & Meglino, B. M. (1994). The role of disposional and situational antecedents in pro-
social organizational behavior: An examination of the intended beneficiaries of prosocial behavior. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 79, 836-844. 
Mieg, H., Gentile, G.-C., & Wehner, T. (2008). Frei-gemeinnütziges Engagement von Unternehmen: 
„Soziale Handlungsorientierungen“, Verantwortung und Unternehmensautonomie. In A.G. Scherer 
& M. Patzer (Hrsg.), Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Unternehmensethik (S.257–275). Wiesbaden: 
Gabler.  
Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist, 54 (12), 1053-1060.   19
Moldaschl, M. (1998). Internalisierung des Marktes. In IfS Frankfurt a.M., INIFES Stadtbergen, ISF 
München & SOFI Göttingen (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Technikberichterstattung - 
Schwerpunkt Moderne Dienstleistungswelten (S.197-251). Berlin: edition sigma. 
Moldaschl, M. (2005). Das soziale Kapital von Arbeitsgruppen und die Nebenfolgen seiner Verwer-
tung. Gruppendynamik und Organisationsberatung, 36 (2), 219-237. 
Moldaschl, M. & Weber, W. G. (1998). The ”three waves” of industrial group work. Historical reflec-
tions on current research on group work. Human Relations, 51 (3), 347-388. 
Moldaschl, M. F. & Weber, W. G. (2009). Trägt organisationale Partizipation zur gesellschaftlichen 
Demokratisierung bei? Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, 25 (3), 87-112. 
Moorman, R. H. & Blakely, G. L. (1995). Individualism-collectivism as an individual difference pre-
dictor of organizational citizenship behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16, 127-142. 
Neubert, J. & Tomczyk, R. (1986). Gruppenverfahren der Arbeitsanalyse und Arbeitsgestaltung. Ber-
lin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. 
NSW/RSE - Netzwerk für sozial verantwortliche Wirtschaft (2004). Thesen und Zielsetzungen (2. 
Aufl., Jan. 2001). In W. G. Weber, P.-P. Pasqualoni & C. Burtscher (Hrsg.), Wirtschaft, Demokratie 
und Soziale Verantwortung (S.399-415). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Organ, D. W. (1988). Organizational Citizenship Behavior: The Good Soldier Syndrome. Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books. 
Organ, D. W. (1990). The motivational basis of organizational citizenship behavior. Research in Or-
ganizational Behavior, 12, 43-72. 
Owen, R. (1963). A New View of Society and Other Writings. London. 
Palgi, M. (2004). Social dilemmas and their solutions: The case of the Kibbutz. In W.G. Weber, C. 
Burtscher & P.-P. Pasqualoni (Hrsg.), Wirtschaft, Demokratie und soziale Verantwortung (S.317-
332). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge Press. 
Petrovsky, A. V. (1985). Studies in Psychology: The Collective and the Individual. Moscow: Progress. 
Podsakoff, P.M., Ahearne, M., & MacKenzie, S.B. (1997). Organizational citizenship behavior and 
the quantity and quality of work group performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 262-270. 
Podsakoff, N. P., Whiting, S. W., Podsakoff, P. M. & Blume, B. D. (2009). Individual- and organiza-
tional-level consequences of organizational citizenship behaviors: A meta-analysis. Journal of Ap-
plied Psychology, 94, 122–141. 
Pullig, K. K. (Hrsg.) (2000) Innovative Unternehmenskulturen. Leonberg: Rosenberger Fachverlag. 
Rifkin, J. (1995). The End of Work. New York: Putnam. 
Rioux , S, & Penner, L.A. (2001). The causes of organizational citizenship behavior: a motivational 
analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 1306–1314. 
Rosner, M. (1998). Work in kibbutz. In U. Leviatan, H. Oliver & J. Quarter (Eds.) (1998), Crisis in the 
Israeli Kibbutz. (pp.27-56). Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Rothschild, J. (2009). Worker’s cooperatives and social enterprise: A forgotten route to social equity 
and democracy. American Behavioral Scientist, 52 (7), 1023-1041. 
Rousseau, D. M. (1998). Why workers still identify with organizations. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 19, 217-233. 
Rusbult, C. E. & Agnew, C. R. (2010). Prosocial motivation and behavior in close relationships. In M. 
Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of 
our nature (pp. 327-345). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Scholl, W. (2007). Plädoyer für eine sozialere, interdisziplinärere und anwendbarere Sozialpsycholo-
gie. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38, 273-284.   20
Shamir, B. (1990). Calculations, values and identities: The sources of collectivistic work motivation. 
Human Relations, 43 (4), 313-332. 
Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978). Intellectual and Manual Labour. London: Macmillan. 
Shperling, Z. & Rousseau, D. M. (2001). When employers share ownership with workers. In C. L. 
Cooper & D. M. Rousseau (Eds.), Trends in Organizational Behavior. Vol.8: Employee versus 
Owner Issues in Organizations (pp.19-44). Chichester: Wiley. 
Strauss, G. (1998). Participation works - if conditions are appropriate. In F. Heller, E. Pusic, G. 
Strauss & B. Wilpert (Eds.), Organizational Participation - Myth and Reality (pp.191-219). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Tjosvold, D. (1998). Cooperative and competitive goal approach to conflict: accomplishments and 
challenges. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 47, 285-313. 
Ulich, E. & Weber, W. G. (1996). Dimensions, criteria and evaluation of work group autonomy. In M. 
West (Ed.), Handbook of Work Group Psychology (pp. 247-282). Chichester: Wiley. 
Ulrich, P. (2004). Bürgerrechte im Unternehmen - Gedanken zum Umgang mit mündigen Wirt-
schaftsbürgern. In W. G. Weber, P.-P. Pasqualoni & C. Burtscher (Hrsg.), Wirtschaft, Demokratie 
und Soziale Verantwortung (S.169-180). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Van Dyne, L., Graham, J.W., & Dienesch, R.M. (1994). Organizational citizenship behavior: construct 
redefintion, measurement and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 765-802. 
Viggiani, F. A. (1997). Democratic hierarchies in the workplace: Structural dilemmas and organiza-
tional action. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 18, 231-260. 
Vilmar, F. & Weber, W. G. (2004). Demokratisierung und Humanisierung der Arbeit - ein Überblick. 
In W. G. Weber, P.-P. Pasqualoni & C. Burtscher (Hrsg.), Wirtschaft, Demokratie und Soziale Ver-
antwortung (S.105-143). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Volpert, W. (2002). Psychologie der frei flottierenden Arbeitskraft. In M Moldaschl & G. Günther 
Voß (Hrsg.), Subjektivierung von Arbeit (S.261-279). München: Hampp. 
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and Motivation. New York: Wiley. 
Weber, W. G. (1997). Analyse von Gruppenarbeit. Bern: Huber. 
Weber, W. G., Ostendorp, C. & Wehner, T. (2003). Soziale Handlungsorientierungen und soziale 
Kompetenzen in interorganisationalen Netzwerken. Zeitschrift für Arbeitswissenschaft, 57 (5), 198-
213. 
Weber, W. G., Unterrainer, C., & Schmid, B.E. (2009). The influence of organizational democracy on 
employees’ socio-moral climate and prosocial behavioral orientations. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 30, 1127-1149. 
Wiesmüller, M. (2004). Kapitalistische Entfremdung oder kollektive Integration? Inhaltsanalytische 
Fallstudie einer Kooperative im mexikanischen Bundesstaat Chiapas. Wien: Südwind.  
Wesche, J.S. & Muck, P.M. (2010). Freiwilliges Arbeitsengagement. Bestandsaufnahme und Perspek-
tiven für eine theoretische Integration. Psychologische Rundschau, 61 (2), 81–100. 
 
 
 